Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? Evidence From DRC by Kodila-Tedika, Oasis et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic
Regime? Evidence From DRC
Kodila-Tedika, Oasis and Khalifa, Sherif and Konso Mulali,
Ben
20 September 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103022/
MPRA Paper No. 103022, posted 25 Sep 2020 07:19 UTC
1 
 
Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? 
Evidence From DRC 
Oasis Kodila-Tedika 
University of Kinshasa (DRC) 
Department of Economic 
oasiskodila@yahoo.fr 
 
Sherif Khalifa 
California State University, Fullerton 
Department of Economics 
skhalifa@fullerton.edu 
 
Benedict Konso Mulali 
Rawbank 
benedict.mulali@rawbank.cd 
Abstract 
Who Becomes Minister in the DRC is a newly created database that provides information on members 
of government. The purpose of this article is to present the database and to document some facts about 
the background of political leaders. The database covers the period 2000-2016. The profile of 
politicians in this database is as follows: born mainly in the DRC, a Congolese minister is a 50-year-
old male and Swahili-speaking, with a bachelor's degree mainly in law or economics. Finally, some 
avenues likely to be explored for future research with this database are indicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the empirical work of Jones and Olken (2005), the identity of political leaders has 
become a major empirical question. A nascent literature has developed to improve our 
understanding the consequences of the background of political actors (biological, educational, 
experience, etc.). One of the weaknesses of this literature is the significant attention given to 
leaders in developed countries (e.g. Alesina et al., 2019; Hayo & Neumeier, 2012, 2014, 
2016; Moessinger, 2014, Jochimsen & Thomasius , 2014) or cross-sectional or panel studies 
including all countries (e.g. Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011; & Kodila-Tedika & Mulunda, 
2016). However, there are few studies devoted only to Africa to estimate the impact of the 
characteristics of African leaders (eg Constant & Tien, 2010; Jorgensen & Bjornskov, 2015; 
François et al., 2015; Díaz Serrano & Sackey, 2016). 
The purpose of our work is not to understand the consequences of the characteristics of 
leaders, but rather to identify the profile of the leader particularly in an autocratic regime. 
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature on the selection of leaders (Dowding & 
Dumont, 2009; Goemans et al., 2009; Alexiadou, 2016; Dal Bo et al., 2017; Gerring et al. 
2019; Bértoa, 2020). The aim of this research is to examine whether certain variables that are 
considered in the empirical studies match with the reality of an autocratic country. This goes 
beyond empirical work to a question of discussing the theoretical elements of leaders’ 
selection, with a special focus on the Congolese data. 
This work is also original because of the database compiled. Indeed, leader studies tend to 
focus more on government leaders and very rarely on members of government. To do this, the 
database of Dowding & Dumont (2009), Alexiadou (2016), Goemans et al. (2009), Bértoa 
(2020) are the best known. Within the framework of this study, we are using a series of 
documents to compile a database that allows us to identify the features of the members of the 
Congolese government and not only of heads of government as in Goemans et al. (2009), or 
only finance ministers as in Alexiadou & Gunaydin (2018) or only foreign affairs ministers as 
in Flores (2016). We, therefore, present a database that will be regularly updated to 
understand the Congolese political landscape. To this end, we also suggest some avenues of 
research likely to be carried out with this database. Moreover, such an exercise focused on a 
country is not common. There are few other studies such as Bäck et al. (2009) for Sweden, 
Berlinski et al. (2010) and Kam et al. (2010) for the UK, Fischer & Kaiser (2007) for 
Germany, Kerby (2011) for Canada, Rodríguez (2011) for Spain. However, “the bulk of this 
work focuses on the determinants of minister selection and survival on a country-by-country 
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basis” (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020, p.2). We also note that these different studies are focused 
on developed countries. They are fewer studies linked to developing countries such as 
Buehler & Ayari (2018) for Tunisia; Kung & Chen (2011) for China; Schleiter (2013) for 
Russia; Woldense (2018) for Ethiopia, 
Another element of originality in this work is that the few studies which are focused on 
members of the government have been more concerned with understanding the impact of 
certain biological traits or finance ministers' background on the orientation of public policies 
(eg Moessinger, 2014, Jochimsen & Thomasius, 2014). Other work is focused on the 
background of the Prime Minister (e.g. Hayo & Neumeier, 2012, 2014, 2016). Still others are 
focused on power sharing based on the ethnicities of government members (Francois et al., 
2015). However, in our case it is a question of defining the characteristics that identify the 
members of the government as a whole. It is not only a question of knowing their background, 
but much more, namely: their origin, their place of birth, their level of education, their past 
(professional, political, etc.), their socio-demographic elements (age, sex, etc.), etc. 
The limitation of this study is related to the time horizon covered. Indeed, our newly created 
database covers the period from 2001 to 2016. The limited time horizon is attributed to the 
cost of information. In the DRC, the Curriculum Vitae of ministers are not accessible. Thus, 
we have so far been unable to collect information on the three governments that run the 
country between 2017 and 2020. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Apart from this introduction, first we 
present the sources of information. Then, we identify the profile of Congolese ministers. 
Fourth, we discuss a few avenues of research that can exploit this database. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn. 
DATA 
There is a tradition in the DRC, or at least for those interested in the DRC, an interest in 
writing biographical essays of Congolese leaders (ministers) or major actors. Artique (1961) 
and Verhaegen & Gérard-Libois (1961) are undoubtedly emblematic examples, and, to our 
knowledge, the first to embark on this sociographic exercise. Since then, volumes have been 
produced by different actors (Mabi & Mutamba, 1986; Kimbulu 1987; Mazanza & Nlandu, 
2005, Agbumana, 2005; Omasombo & Kennes, 2006; Omasombo, 2009) or institutions 
(Chambre de commerce et d’industrie franco-zairoise, 1996). However, this does not mean 
that it is easy to access the detailed identities of Congolese politicians, contrary to the case of 
4 
 
advanced countries (e.g. Razafindrakoto et al, 2017), where the Curriculum Vitae of ministers 
are available online. In addition, the information collected by these different authors remains 
biographical without analysis. The strong point of this work is precisely to go beyond the 
simple narrative of these authors to identify a profile. Also, another major element is filling 
the gaps in the narrative of one author by expanding it with another source to collect more 
data. 
Moreover, the database only covers the period from 2000 to 2016. The incompleteness of 
documents or content does not allow us to consider the period before 2000 effectively. The 
period after 2016 is the next challenge. Thus, the database will be regularly updated at the 
indicated periods. 
To collect the data, we used several sources to document the profile of a Congolese minister 
during the said period. First, we considered the books of Mabi & Mutamba (1986), Kimbulu 
(1987), Mazanza & Nlandu (2005), Agbumana (2005), Omasombo & Kennes (2006), 
Omasombo (2009) to glean all necessary information. The presidential ordinances appointing 
the various ministers were also put to use in addition to news articles. We also used the 
information available in the media to fill in the information gaps. 
For the period under review, it should be noted that the information was difficult to access for 
all the 217 ministers of this period. Thus, we will have less observations for some variables 
compared to others. 
RESULTS 
3.1 Regionalism 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of ministers by province of origin. In fact, there 
is a literature that indicates the close link that exists between the association between power 
and ethnicities, particularly in Africa (Francois et al., 2015). Figure 1a is based on 189 
ministers, ie a coverage rate of 87.1% for all ministers for the period. Figure 1b is based on an 
84.3% coverage rate. According to figure 1a, the ministers come from Katanga (15%), then 
from Bandundu (13.2%) and Équateur (12.7%). 41% of ministers came from these three 
provinces. In the case of 1b, the province of South Kivu provided the most ministers (12.6%), 
followed by Kwilu (8.7%) and Kongo-central (7%). The difference between the two maps is 
that Figure 1.b applies to the new administrative configuration of the country. However, the 
old configuration prevailed longer than the new one to the extent that it covered more of the 
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governments that ran the country. In comparing the two maps, the salient fact is in map 1a the  
province of the President also provided most of the ministers, while in map 1b, the province 
of the President does not even appear in the top three. 
This does not mean that questions of regionalism are absent in the Congolese government 
composition. The reality confirmed by this figure is that it is the linguistic distance that is a 
determining variable. In map 1.a, 53.4% of the Congolese ministers come from an area where 
the Swahili language is the spoken language. While on map 1.b, 55.2% of the ministers come 
from this Swahili - speaking space. 
Figure. 1 Ministers dispatching per provinces of  origin 
 
 
Figure 1.a Figure 1.b 
3.2 Skills 
To consider the skills of politicians, we use several approximations including location of 
training, level of education attained, number of diplomas and field of study. Figure 2 
compares the proportion of Congolese ministers who have studied abroad and the level of 
education attained by them. These variables are increasingly studied in the literature. For 
instance, Mercier (2016) documents a positive effect of the chief executive having studied 
abroad on the level of democracy in his country during his administration. This effect remains 
after controlling for the level of education and the initial professional occupation. This work 
by Mercier (2016) is an exploration of a channel highlighted by Spilimbergo (2009), who first 
documented the positive impact of foreign education of leaders on democracy in their home 
country, provided that their studies are carried out in a democratic regime. To also support 
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Spilimbergo (2009), Gift & Krcmaric (2015) prove that leaders who studied in the West 
support the democratization of their country of origin. Constant & Tien (2010) find a 
significant advantage on FDI flows for African leaders who have studied abroad. Dreher & 
Yu (2016) also provide evidence on foreign education, but this time on home country foreign 
policies. Minasyan (2017) also examines the impact of the foreign studies by American 
leaders on the allocation of American aid. 
As for the educational attainment of the leader, there is also an abundant literature. There are 
basically two streams of literature. The first is interested in the cognitive skills of leaders (e.g. 
Rindermann et al., 2009; Kodila-Tedika, 2014; Dal Bo et al., 2017). Given that these variables 
are not available for our context, our approach follows the second stream, which considers the 
level of educational attainment of political leaders. Besley et al. (2011) finds that the level of 
education attained by leaders counts for better economic performance, captured by economic 
growth. Jørgensen & Bjørnskov (2015) confirm this conclusion, considering the background 
of the first African leaders after independence. Diaz-Serrano & Pérez (2013) found a 
statistically significant association between the level of study of leaders on the education of 
their citizens. Besley & Reynal-Querol (2011) show that democratic regimes are those which 
select both leaders with a high level of education but also those who have notably studied 
abroad. 
In our database, we were able to determine the location of training of 80.2% of all Congolese 
ministers of the period. For this portion, 48.9% were at least trained in foreign countries 
against 51.1% that were not. This difference is not statistically significant with a p-value of 
around 0.3262. We have 85% of ministers for whom we have education level information. 
The trends are as follows: 56% of Congolese ministers have reached the bachelor's level; 23% 
have a doctorate degree; 13% obtained a master's degree; 5.4% have completed the first 
university cycle, ie the graduate; 1.6% have just a high school diploma and 0.5% have 
vocational training. 
Figure 2. Place of training/formation and level of education 
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In addition to these two variables, there is also interest in the literature for the leaders’ field of 
study. Dreher et al. (2009) examine the effect of the field of study of leaders on reforms. 
Jochimsen & Thomasius (2014) explore the effect of the diploma of finance ministers on the 
budgetary and fiscal performance. Figure 3 presents the number of ministers who obtained 
each diploma. The figure shows that the majority of Congolese ministers have a law degree, 
followed by economics degree. 
Figure 3. Field of study 
 
We also consider another variable, which has not yet been considered in studies of political 
leaders, namely the number of diplomas obtained. Figure 4 below shows the situation of 
ministers who have obtained several diplomas. It is unusual for a Congolese minister to hold 
more than one diploma: 165 cases of a single diploma are identified compared to only 10 
cases of at least two diplomas and 4 cases of at least three diplomas. 
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Figure 4. Number of diplomas 
 
3.3 Professional experience and political history 
Where politicians come from before entering the political arena is also a major part of the 
literature today. Some studies examine the effect of managers' occupational choice on reforms 
(Dreher et al., 2009), on fiscal-budgetary results (eg Moessinger, 2014, Jochimsen & 
Thomasius, 2014), on growth (Jørgensen & Bjørnskov, 2015) and on foreign policy (Dreher 
& Yu, 2016), etc. 
Other work has linked it to the family background of politicians. For example, Dal Bó et al. 
(2009) show that dynastic prevalence in the Congress of the United States is highly 
comparable to that in other occupations, and that political dynasties do not merely reflect 
permanent differences in family characteristics. Asako et al. (2014) investigate the effects of 
dynastic politicians in Japan. Mendoza et al. (2016) consider the impact of the political 
dynasty on poverty in the Philippines. Patrikios & Chatzikonstantinou (2015) show a certain 
stability of the political dynasty within the Greek parliament. In the Italian case, Geys (2017) 
indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate 
favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education. Besley & Reynal-
Querol (2017) have linked hereditary leaders and economic growth. 
Figure 5 shows the professional career for a politician before becoming a minister. Out of the 
data collected (83.4% of all ministers), 33.7% of ministers had a history with the private 
sector, 11% of ministers out of 84% of the data collected have experience with international 
institutions, and 26% of ministers out of 86% of the data collected have university experience 
either in research or in teaching. On the political past, out of 84% of the data collected, 4.9% 
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of Congolese ministers have political relatives, 38% of ministers have already worked with 
former presidents (24% with Mobutu and 14% with Kabila senior), out of 85% of the data 
collected. Out of 86% of the data collected, 25.7% are associated with rebellion movements. 
Figure 5. Professional and political past 
 
 
3.4 Sociobiological data 
The literature on the gender of leaders is oriented more towards legislative issues (eg Austen 
& Mavisakalyan, 2016) and on heads of the executive (eg Baskaran & Hessami, 2017; 
Beaman, et al. 2012; Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2017). There is fewer literature on the effects 
of the gender of the members of the government. Some focus on the consequences of female 
members of government (Mavisakalyan, 2014; Dollar et al. 2001; Atchison & Down, 2009). 
Figure 6 breaks down ministers according to their gender. Of the 217 ministers who have 
been assigned since 2000, the number is only 26. The gap is considerable, and, thus, the 
difference test is highly statistically significant. 
Figure 6. Dispatching of ministers by gender 
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There are studies that also focus on the effect of the age of the politicians. Alesina et al. 
(2019) find that the age of politicians affects the quality of economic policy. Casaburi & 
Troiano (2016) indicates the effect of the age of politicians on tax application. Jong-A-Pin & 
Mierau (2011) examine the age of dictators on economic growth. Kodila-Tedika & Mulunda 
(2016) attempt to explore the association between the age of politicians and regulatory 
reforms. Horowitz et al. (20005) consider the age of politicians in international conflicts. 
Other works recognize the importance of the age of the leader variable and control for it in 
their estimates (e.g. Hayo & Neumeier, 2012, 2014, 2016; Diaz-Serrano and Pérez 2013; 
Diaz-Serrano & Sackey 2016). 
Figure 7 shows the  distribution of the age of the Congolese ministers. These graphs are 
created on the availability of 193 pieces of information, or 88.9% of the data collected. The 
age is the difference between the year of first coming to power during the period considered 
in the database and the politician's year of birth. The Skewness and Kurtosis tests argue for a 
normal distribution, because the two probabilities are respectively 0.123 and 0.899. We, 
therefore, cannot reject the null hypothesis of the normality of the distribution. In other words, 
Congolese political leaders are not concentrated on either the old age or the young age. The 
average age is 50.5 years and the median age is 50. The scatter around the mean is quite large 
because the standard deviation is 8.8. 
The place of birth of politicians is not directly studied in the literature, nor the question of 
performance of leaders with dual nationality. However, this variable could be critical in 
determining the performance of politicians and other outcomes. In our data, the proportion of 
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those born outside is very insignificant: out of 85% of information available, only 2% of 
Congolese ministers were born abroad. 
Figure 7. Age and place of birth 
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This database is useful because it allows us answer several questions. The first research 
questions arise from the observation of the data in this database. As an example, we create 
graph 8 from the database. This graph shows that all ministers born in the 20s are housed in 
1920 and so on. We can see that those belonging to the 1920s did not appear until 2007. But 
those of the 1930s are present in the governments of 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2010. It is clear 
that the trend is declining till 2011. The decade of the 1940s remains almost constant in all 
governments with an average proportion of 23.7%. This is quite a puzzle compared to the 
decades that have come after the 1940s. The questions that arise are: What is so special about 
the 1940s? What explains the rapid decline in the number of ministers born in the 1950s? 
How can we understand the slow increase of the 1960s? what about the increase in the 
number of those born in the 1970s? Is it the change in the political class de facto or de jure? 
Figure 8. Evolution of the political class by age 
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Other questions also arise from the database. Is the overwhelming majority of male ministers 
seen in figure 6 a situation that is escalating over time? Is the political market closed to 
women? Are these considerations linked to cultural considerations?  
There are also external questions for which this database can be useful. As a way of 
illustration, one can consider the recent research of Kodila Tedika et al. (2019). The authors 
are interested in technological adoption at the micro level. They use the sample of Congolese 
politicians with the variables associated with each minister to try to understand why 
politicians are or are not adopting a technology, in this case twitter. Why is there a delay in 
adoption? What explains the intensity of use for those who have adopted it? This research is 
very original, more particularly for developing countries. This line of research would not be 
possible without this database. 
The literature mentioned in this article seems to indicate that the human capital of managers is 
critical for performance. In order to try to explore such a track within each Congolese sectoral 
ministry, it is necessary to use the variables in this database. 
Finally, another avenue of research is the profiling of the Congolese political landscape. It is 
true that these are not all politicians, but at least with this base we know how to regularly 
draw the contours of those who become ministers in the DRC. 
CONCLUSION 
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This paper compiles a database that allows us to explore the background of politicians and 
cabinet members in the DRC from 2000-2016. The paper examines the education, age, 
professional experience, language, gender, and the birth place of these political figures. The 
compiled data shows that these politicians are mostly born in the DRC, a 50-year-old male, 
Swahili-speaking, with a bachelor's degree mainly in law or economics. The paper also 
suggests some avenues to be explored for future research. 
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